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Abstract
Set within the growing literature on migration and development, this paper 
has two interlinked objectives. First, it examines remittances, a key element 
of the migration-development nexus, from a gendered perspective. Second 
it does so in a comparative empirical perspective, focusing on remittance 
behaviour in two contrasting settings, albania and ecuador. both countries 
have experienced mass emigration in recent decades. research is based 
on household surveys with remittance receivers in selected rural areas of 
both countries, supplemented by in-depth interviews with both senders 
and receivers of remittances. by using the concept of ‘remittance dyads’ 
– person-to-person transfers of money and gifts – we examine the gendered 
mechanics of conveying and managing remittances to see if they have the 
potential to reshape gender relations in these migrant households. they do, 
but the effects are limited.
Keywords: migration, development, remittances, gender, Albania, Ecuador 
1. Introduction
There has been a surge of interest over the past decade in the relation-
ship between migration and development. The def ining contribution 
which kick-started this trend was Van Hear and Sørensen’s (2003) The 
Migration-Development Nexus, wherein remittances were highlighted as 
the key contribution that migration could make to the improvement in 
well-being of people in migrant source countries. Indeed, remittances 
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came to be regarded as a kind of ‘development mantra’ (Kapur 2004); a 
self-help mechanism which targets those households and families which 
need f inancial support the most and which are thereby rewarded for the 
sacrif ice of sending one or more family members abroad to work, often 
in very diff icult conditions. Towards the end of the decade a somewhat 
more critical perspective emerged. This challenged the ‘mantra’ by drawing 
attention to remittances’ problematic relationship with social inequality, 
and to the need to open up the ‘black box’ of remittances to expose and 
critically analyse the individual-scale dynamics and power relationships 
involved (Carling 2008a; de Haas 2007a; Kunz 2008).
Our paper furthers this critical perspective by developing two inter-
linked lines of analysis. First, we pay particular attention to the way that 
remittance transfers are gendered processes: remitting patterns are both 
shaped by gendered social and kinship structures and have the potential to 
reshape gender relations, for instance through the involvement of women in 
sending, receiving and administering remittances. Whether this potential 
is realised is another matter. Second, the paper compares two migration-
remittance systems in contrasting regions of the world: Ecuador-USA and 
Albania-Greece. This choice for comparison is not casual, since both sending 
countries experienced sudden mass emigrations triggered by economic 
and political shocks in the 1990s: in Albania the chaotic exit from com-
munism and then economic collapse and civil unrest in 1997; in Ecuador 
political instability, crippling structural adjustment measures, followed 
by ‘dollarization’ in 2000. Based on empirical surveys (questionnaires to 
remittance-receiving households and interviews with remittance senders 
and receivers), we unpack the family and household dynamics of remittance 
transfers through an in-depth study of person-to-person ‘remittance dyads’.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review the shift-
ing theoretical interpretations of the relationship between migration and 
development, paying particular attention to the key role that remittances 
play in these understandings, and to the need to apply a gendered analysis. 
Next come two contextual sections: the geographical and migratory set-
tings of Albania and Ecuador; and an outline of the survey methods used 
to collect primary data. In the ‘results’ sections of the paper we examine 
the dyadic patterns of remittances from New York to Ecuador and from 
Greece to Albania. We explain how these reflect the male-led character of 
the two migration systems, and we evaluate the extent to which evolving 
remittance dynamics have the potential to re-texture gender relations. In 
the two case-studies under review we f ind that changes in gender relations 
are rather modest.
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2. Migration and development
Although the historic role of migration in the development of receiving 
countries has long been acknowledged (Piore 1979; Potts 1990; Thomas 
1954), interest in migration’s impact on sending countries is much more 
recent. It is this latter relationship that concerns us here. The apparent 
neutrality of the now-fashionable phrase ‘migration-development nexus’ 
hides multiple questions about definition and the nature and directionality 
of causal relationships. According to Raghuram (2009) the ‘edif ice’ of the 
migration-development discourse needs to be ‘unsettled’. She asks: ‘which 
migration, what development?’ In answer to the f irst question, we look 
at labour migration from relatively poor to richer countries – in global 
‘compass’ migration terms, from South to North, and East to West.
The ‘what development?’ question is more diff icult to answer. Beyond 
the world of neoclassical economics where development equates growth 
in national income, most social scientists subscribe to a much broader 
definition which includes cognisance and measurement of poverty, health, 
education, inequality and human capital. We would also factor gender 
equality into this mix. Recognising the multidimensional nature of develop-
ment has been fundamental in the work of the United Nations Development 
Programme in compiling the human development index. Successive UNDP 
reports follow a ‘capabilities’ approach to conceptualising development 
which emphasises freedom of choice and the ability to achieve vital ‘beings 
and doings’ (UNDP 2009: 14, 208).
Two further questions are key. First, does migration cause development, 
or is it the other way round? Second, should not the causality question be 
posed in terms of migration and underdevelopment?
Few would dispute that, in a low-income country, emigration can be a 
rational response to poverty and limited life opportunities. The question 
is, what happens next? One of the myths of migration is the so-called ‘root 
causes’ approach which states that, if migration results from underdevelop-
ment, then by removing the condition of underdevelopment, migration 
will cease. Quite apart from the fact that this stance ‘carries the unspoken 
message that migration is a bad thing that ought to be stopped’ (Castles 2009: 
442, his emphasis), the reality is that the increased economic resources and 
improved communications that development brings actually make it easier 
for more people to migrate to better opportunities abroad (de Haas 2007b).
This is only the beginning of the ‘what happens next?’ question. The 
real conundrum comes with the impact of migration on the future develop-
ment of the sending country or region. Put simply, does migration lead to 
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development? And if so, does this development feed further migration, as 
postulated above? Or does migration act to further reproduce the condition 
of underdevelopment? And if so, does continuing underdevelopment lead 
to continuing migration? In other words, does the migration-development 
nexus take the form of a virtuous cycle, or a vicious one?
2.1. Optimism, pessimism, and pendulum swings
As Hein de Haas has recently argued (2010, 2012; see also Faist and Fauser 
2011), the debate between these two opposing interpretations has swung 
like a pendulum, from optimism in the 1950s and 1960s to pessimism in the 
1970s and 1980s, and back again to optimism in the 1990s and 2000s. Now, 
we detect the start of a new swing towards pessimism.
The industrial expansion of Western Europe and North America in the 
early postwar decades was sustained by large-scale worker migration from 
Southern Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere. Neoclassical economics 
‘explained’ this mass transfer as a spatial reallocation from labour-rich to 
labour-poor countries, spurred by the market incentive of much higher 
wages. Under this model, migration continues until there is factor-price 
equalisation, at which point migration stops because wage discrepancies are 
no greater than the cost of migration. Also in the ‘pure’ neoclassical model, 
there are no remittances and no return migration, since migrants are viewed 
as having moved for good as part of the adjustment to spatial equilibrium 
of labour. However, in many European countries, migrants were treated as 
‘guest-workers’ who would eventually return home. Part of this migration 
management regime was the ‘developmentalist’ assumption that migrants 
would take back savings, training, new ideas and entrepreneurialism; all of 
which would stimulate development in their home countries. For the most 
part, these were pious hopes. Detailed studies of Turkey, the country which 
had supplied the largest number of migrant workers to Europe, questioned 
both the scale and nature of the ‘emigration of surplus labour and return 
of innovation’ model (Abadan-Unat et al. 1974; Paine 1974). The swing to 
pessimism had begun.
Incorporating late-1960s’ thinking from the Latin American ‘dependency 
school’ (Frank 1969) as well as Third-Worldist concerns over brain drain from 
Africa and Asia (Bhaghwati 1976), growing pessimism over the economic 
and moral value of migration reflected Marxist theories of capitalism’s ex-
ploitation of (migrant) workers. Applying the dependency model to Europe, 
Seers (1979) argued that periphery-to-core migration was the syndrome of 
the Frankian notion of the ‘development of underdevelopment’ rather than a 
stimulus to development in migrant-origin countries. Remittances – hardly 
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noticed in the neoclassic model – were acknowledged but they were not seen 
as a productive input into the development process. Rather, it was alleged, 
they were ‘frittered away’ on conspicuous consumption, used to build un-
necessarily luxurious housing, or spent on other ‘non-productive’ outlets 
such as small shops in migrants’ home villages (Lipton 1980; Rhoades 1978). 
According to Castles and Kosack, in a book which captured the theoretical 
zeitgeist of the time, ‘labour migration is a form of development aid given 
by the poor countries to the rich ones’ (1973: 8).
Around 1990, the pendulum swung again, back to what de Haas (2012: 
19) calls ‘neo-optimism’. Drawing partly on de Haas (2010, 2012) and Faist 
and Fauser (2011), we posit four main reasons for this. First, the 1980s and 
1990s saw a body of empirical research which suggested that, in certain 
circumstances, migration could stimulate home-country development. In 
other words, alongside negative ‘backwash’ effects (depopulation, brain 
drain, inflation etc.) were also ‘trickle-down’ effects whereby remittances 
and migrants’ investments gave a multiplier boost to the local economy.
Second, the neo-liberal, individualist ethos of the 1990s and 2000s placed 
migrants centre-stage as development actors, in contrast to the neoclas-
sical and neo-Marxist ideologies which viewed migrants either as atoms 
responding to market forces or as victim-pawns of the exploitative capitalist 
system. Alongside the celebration of the migrant as the ‘hero’ of develop-
ment comes an emphasis on remittances: not only f inancial remittances 
but also backflows of knowledge, ideas and new behaviours – what Peggy 
Levitt (1998) called ‘social remittances’.
Third, migration-development neo-optimism was underpinned by 
the ‘new economics of labour migration’ (see Lucas and Stark 1985; Stark 
1991; Stark and Bloom 1985). Although NELM drew on some aspects of the 
neoclassical model, it incorporated two fundamental differences from the 
earlier way of thinking. First, it aggregated migration decision-making 
and economic behaviour to the ‘meso-scale’ of the family and community; 
and second it combined income maximisation with risk aversion. In this 
way, migration and remittances were seen as a hedge against the failure 
of other elements of household income, such as a crop wipe-out. In short, 
NELM reconceptualised migration as a household livelihood strategy, with 
remittances as the central plank.
The f inal paradigm shift which gave theoretical purchase to the new 
optimism was the transnationalist view of migration introduced by Glick 
Schiller et al. (1995). This, too, was a migrant-centred model, which saw 
migrants as agents of their own development, and that of their home com-
munities. The ‘transnational turn’ recognised the increased possibilities 
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of migrants and their families to live more or less simultaneously in two 
(or more) places, thanks to improved techniques and lowered costs of 
international travel and communication. Remittances are seen as the key 
element of the economics of transnational living (Guarnizo 2003).
Especially over the past decade, the ‘virtuous’ interpretation of the 
migration-development cycle has dominated international discourse, in-
cluding the Global Forum for Migration and Development, the World Bank, 
UNDP, and the UK’s Department for International Development (Piper 
2009). The consensus view is that migration can be a ‘route out of poverty’ 
for many and a pathway to prosperity for some; therefore, echoing the title 
of the 2009 UNDP Human Development Report, the barriers to mobility need 
to be overcome. Richard Black, director of a major DfID-funded programme 
of research on migration and poverty at the University of Sussex, argues that 
migration should be considered an international ‘public good’ because of 
its potential to alleviate poverty and stimulate development (2011).
More sceptical views emerged at the turn of the decade. Delgado Wise 
and Márquez Covarrubias (2011) restated the neo-Marxist critique, basing 
their arguments on their interpretation of the ‘asymmetric and subordi-
nated’ Mexico-US migratory system, with migrant workers incorporated 
into the lowest and most exploited segments of the highly polarised US 
labour market. Meanwhile Skeldon (2008) warned of the danger of expecting 
too much from migrants’ capability to effect real development, and asked 
whether it is morally justif ied to impose on migrants a ‘duty’ to stimulate 
home-country development when their lives – thanks partly to the global re-
gime of migration control which forces them into irregularity – are blighted 
by low wages, precariousness, deskilling and racism (Bakewell 2007). Hence, 
‘we may be at a new turning-point… heading towards a neo-pessimistic 
backswing of the migration and development pendulum’ (de Haas 2012: 22).
2.2. Opening up and gendering the ‘black box’ of remittances
Throughout the above debate on the shifting terrain of the migration-
development relationship, remittances have held a fluctuating and often 
vicarious position, coming increasingly to the fore in the neo-optimism 
phase which still characterises present-day policy. Economists and de-
velopment planners have latched on to remittances as a f inancial f low 
to developing and transition countries which has to be maximised, and 
prudently invested, without paying much attention to their ontology and 
phenomenology. What does the sending and receiving of remittances mean 
to the individual actors involved? Who, exactly, sends; and who receives? 
How do they def ine what ‘counts’ as remittances and what does not? In 
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short, we see remittances as a ‘black box’ that needs to be opened up and 
peered into in order to understand what is really going on.
Building on the now-well-established transnational paradigm, we 
conceptualise remittances as transnational gendered social practice which 
reflects the gender structures of both the societies of migrant origin and 
destination, as well as the gender relations which are embedded in the 
migration and remittances processes themselves. Unpacking the gendered 
social practice of remittances, we observe a variety of ‘remittance dyads’ 
(Carling 2007). The remittance dyad is an individual sender-to-receiver 
pairing, but variety is introduced by the distinction between primary and 
secondary dyads. A male migrant could have as his main dyadic partner 
his wife in the home village, but might also remit smaller amounts to his 
parents, his secondary dyad, perhaps privileging his father as the recipient. 
Thus we begin to see the relevance of a gendered analysis of remittances, 
which is as yet underdeveloped.
The existing literature on gender and remittances falls into two camps. 
First there are papers which treat gender purely as a dichotomous variable 
in looking at whether men or women are the more reliable remitters, and 
who remits more. Reviewing this literature, Carling (2008b: 588) f inds 
it inconclusive. It often seems that men are more likely to remit, and to 
remit larger amounts, but women may remit a larger proportion of their 
(generally lower) wages than men. Another common view is that women, 
because of their stronger family orientation and nurturing nature, are more 
‘sensible’ receivers and managers of remittances than men; women direct 
remittances to family welfare, health and education, men towards land, 
housing, vehicles, and gadgets (Rahman and Fee 2009). However, there 
is little systematic evidence, let alone statistical proof, to support these 
generalisations.
The second strand of literature challenges the ‘Are men or women better 
remitters?’ discourse and tries to unravel the gender relations behind the 
entire migration-remittances cycle (King and Vullnetari 2010). A landmark 
in this more integrated approach was the programme of research launched 
in the latter half of the 2000s on ‘Gender, Remittances and Development’ 
by the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for 
the Advancement of Women (UN-INSRAW). In their working paper which 
acted as the ideological and literature-survey platform for the UN-INSTRAW 
research, Ramírez et al. (2005) make two key points:
 – Gender is a cross-cutting element throughout all stages of the migra-
tion process. It not only influences physical movement across national 
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borders, but gender relations are themselves negotiated and either 
reconfirmed or reconfigured within transnational migratory contexts.
 – Remittances are more than just periodic f inancial transfers: they are 
the result of complex processes of negotiation within households that 
are immersed in intricate networks of relations between the diaspora 
and the countries of origin. Above all, decisions about how remittances 
are spent, who benefits, and longer-term effects on family welfare and 
structure, are not gender-neutral.
These orientational statements prompt further consideration. We can 
deepen the theoretical analysis by placing it with the ‘gendered geographies 
of power’ framework of Mahler and Pessar (2001). The three key components 
of this conceptual model are, f irstly, the notion of power geometries. As 
Doreen Massey points out (1994: 149), f lows of people, goods, money and 
images in our highly globalised but unequal world are subject to different 
constellations of power. Secondly, social location refers to individuals’ 
position within power hierarchies, which include social-class and kinship 
structures. Thirdly, geographic scale captures the way in which gender-
power relations operate across multiple levels, from the (female) body which 
in various ways is controlled or excluded, to the meso-scale domains of 
family and community, to the national and international scales.
We now move to the empirical part of our paper in which we attempt to 
answer questions relating to the foregoing conceptual outline at two levels. 
First, in relation to our scoping of the migration-development nexus, do the 
cases of Albania and Ecuador broadly f it the virtuous or the vicious cycle 
view of the nexus? Second, focusing more specif ically on remittances and 
their link to the migration-development debate, how are these f inancial 
and allied transfers gendered in our two case-studies? This, in turn, breaks 
down into two recursive questions:
 – What are the gender and family structures that shape migration and 
remittance behaviour?
 – How does the sending and receiving of remittances reshape gender 
relations in migrant communities and sending areas?
3. The settings: Albania and Greece, Ecuador and the 
United States
The research is based on two international migrations: one short-distance, 
linking adjacent countries in the Balkans, the other a globe-spanning South to 
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North ‘hemispheric’ migration. The Albania-Greece study was carried out by 
King and Vullnetari as part of the aforementioned UN-INSTRAW programme 
of research (see Vullnetari and King 2011; also King et al. 2011). The Ecuador-US 
study is drawn from Mata-Codesal’s doctoral thesis (Mata-Codesal 2011).
Table 1 sets out some comparative statistics on the two migrant-origin 
countries. Several f igures are strikingly similar: human development, life 
expectancy, GNI per capita, recent GDP growth, stock of emigrants, and 
the share of emigrants who are tertiary-educated. Others are different: the 
relative scale of emigration is much greater for Albania, likewise the weight 
of remittances per head of the country-of-origin population. The average 
remittance sent per emigrant is higher for Ecuador, a fact that reflects the 
greater income divide between Ecuador and the US on the one hand, and 
Albania and Greece on the other.
Table 1   Albania and Ecuador: population, development, migration and remittance 
statistics
Albania Ecuador
Population, 2009 (millions) 3.2 13.6
GNI per capita 2009 (Atlas method, US $) 3,950 3,920
GDP annual average growth, 2005-09 (%) 5.0 4.3
Human Development Index (2007) 0.818 0.806
Life expectancy at birth (2007) 76.9 75.0
Stock of emigrants, 2010 (´ 000) 1,438 1,148
Emigrants as share of resident population (%) 45.4 8.3
Main destination countries Greece, Italy USA, Spain
Emigration of tertiary-educated (% of total emigration) 9.0 9.5
Remittances, 2009 (US $ millions) 1,317 2,502
Average remittance per head of resident population (US $) 412 184
Average remittance per migrant (US $) 916 2,179
Source: UNDP (2009: 168, 172); World Bank (2011: 54, 108).
Albanian emigration started in 1991, following 45 years of harsh communist 
rule during which emigration was banned. Whilst part of the eagerness to 
migrate was the natural curiosity of people to see a world that had been 
denied them, the most important push factor was the dire economic situ-
ation produced by the chaotic transition to ‘democracy’ and a free-market 
economy, which left many people without jobs or other means of support. 
By 2010, 1.4 million Albanians were abroad, most of them in Greece (600,000) 
and Italy (400,000).
Throughout the early years of emigration, most of the movement was 
irregular, since Albanians had few legal opportunities to enter and legally 
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work in Greece, or elsewhere. Entry to Greece was on foot, using paths 
which crossed the mountainous border, dodging the Greek border police. 
Given the nature of these treks as arduous and dangerous, as well as the 
patriarchal nature of Albanian families which limited the independent 
mobility of women, most of the emigrants in the 1990s were men.
A major change in the structural position of Albanians in Greek society 
occurred in 1998 when a regularisation scheme was launched: more than 
200,000 Albanians legalised their presence in Greece. Further regularisa-
tions took place in the 2000s. These measures allowed Albanians to improve 
their access to the labour market and protect themselves from the kinds 
of exploitation that ‘illegal’ immigrants are vulnerable to. Regularisation 
also gave them the basis to bring over their wives and families, or to start 
a family in Greece. This combined legal, economic and family-structure 
transition is crucial for understanding differentiated patterns of remittance 
dyads. Men have continued their initial occupational specialisations in the 
farm-labour and building sectors but have been able to access (at least up to 
the recent severe recession in Greece) more secure work, including setting 
up their own small businesses in f ields such as construction, removals, 
house repairs etc. Women work mainly as domestic cleaners or as carers 
of small children and elderly people (Hatziprokopiou 2003).
Emigration from Ecuador to the US dates to the 1950s, but accelerated 
during the 1990s due to economic stress produced by structural adjustment 
measures (Pribilsky 2007). Towards the end of that decade the economy 
collapsed and in 2000, in a desperate measure to curb hyperinflation, the 
US dollar replaced the Ecuadorian sucre as the country’s currency. This 
monetary switch proved socially regressive, ruining the already-precarious 
f inancial situation of the poor and less well-off. The political situation was 
equally unstable, with ten different governments during 1996-2007. Faced 
with this dire economic and political situation, many Ecuadorian men 
emigrated in order to earn remittances to support their families. Even 
though the US became progressively more expensive and risky compared 
to European destinations (notably Spain), Ecuadorians continued to head 
for New York since the monetary rewards are perceived to be higher there.1
Recent estimates give f igures of approximately 500,000 Ecuadorians 
living in the US, and 400,000 in Spain (Gratton 2007). Emigration to New 
York is male-dominated and irregular: most men work in construction or 
in other manual occupations where employers ask no questions about legal 
status. Emigration to Spain is female-dominated and has fewer obstacles: 
most entered as visa-free tourists and overstayed, subsequently taking 
advantage of Spain’s periodic regularisations.2
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4. Research design and methods
Within the two bi-national contexts, f ield research was articulated along 
localised ‘migration-remittance corridors’. Three contiguous villages in the 
municipality of Burim (a pseudonym) in southern Albania were chosen 
to represent the migration trends and ethno-religious characteristics of 
south-central Albania (Muslim majority, with some Orthodox Christians 
and socially marginalised Roma). The villages have a combined population 
of around 7000 and are located at some distance from Korçë, the most 
important administrative and economic centre in this part of Albania. 
Burim lies at an altitude of 800 metres within an elevated plain with 
favourable soils for farming. Summers are hot and dry, winters wet and 
cool with occasional snowfalls. Mixed agriculture is practised – cereals, 
vegetables and fruit (apples are a local specialism), plus pigs, cattle, sheep 
and poultry. Although there are some signs of a remittance-led revival, 
agriculture has languished into semi-subsistency due to the break-up of the 
communist-era cooperatives into smallholdings and the abandonment of 
infrastructures, as well as the effects of emigration itself. An estimated 80 
per cent of emigration from Burim is to Greece, most of it to Thessaloniki, 
the second city of Greece, more accessible than Athens.
Xarbán, the Ecuadorian f ield location (also a pseudonym), has a popula-
tion of just over 2000; it is in the southern province of Azuay, whose capital 
Cuenca is about an hour and a half away by bus. Xarbán is positioned on 
the lower slope of a large valley system. The lowest land, at around 2500 
metres, is given over to agriculture (corn, potatoes, tomatoes, beans, fruits); 
the middle-range land is cattle pasture; the highest land, above 3500 m, 
is unusable. The climate is high-altitude tropical, with abundant rain but 
also a dry season. Mounting population pressure on hilly and erodible 
land has progressively split up ownership into minifundios (less than 5 
hectares) and microfundios (< 1 ha). Whilst agriculture provides the basis 
for survival, it allows for little improvement in living standards or life 
ambitions (Carpio Benalcázar 1992: 46). Migration, initially internal (to the 
coastal sugar estates and the Amazon basin) and then international, to the 
US, became the favoured way to progress. Emigration became large-scale 
during the 1990s and 2000s following a destructive landslide in 1993 and 
the economic problems referred to earlier. As with Albanian migration 
to Greece, the recession years since 2008 have had a dampening effect on 
emigration. The much smaller number of female immigrants in New York 
are involved in raising families and working part-time as domestic cleaners 
and baby-sitters. Given the cost of migration, on average $15,000 per head, 
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most migrants can only start to rend remittances after a year or two, once 
their debt is paid off.
Both projects comprised two main f ield instruments: a village-based 
household survey to remittance receivers; and follow-up interviews to 
some remittance receivers, and to remittance senders in New York and 
Thessaloniki. Although the sample sizes of the questionnaire surveys dif-
fered (350 households in Burim, 76 in Xarbán), the sample fraction of the 
village populations was roughly equal at around 15 per cent.3 Whilst the 
two investigations were independent, the survey schedule contained many 
questions on remittances which were identical or closely similar – notably 
those relating to dyads, amounts sent, frequency and means of transfer, 
management of remittance spending, and the uses to which remittances 
were put. Both surveys were administered via a process of random and 
snowball sampling. We are confident that, whilst statistically ‘true’ rep-
resentativeness cannot be guaranteed, there is a good correspondence 
between the samples taken and the wider population of village households 
with migrants abroad.
In both Burim and Xarbán, 25 in-depth interviews were carried out in 
the respective communities with remittance receivers, local key informants 
and returnees. A further 20 interviews were taken with remittance send-
ers in Thessaloniki, and 10 in New York. Where possible, interviews were 
recorded and transcribed; otherwise extensive notes were taken. The formal 
research instruments were supplemented by ethnographic observations in 
all research sites.
A f inal note on timing. The f ieldwork was carried out between late 
2007 and early 2009; hence before or during the early months of the global 
recession, which for that reason does not feature much in our discussion.
5. Sending and receiving remittances
We start with background data from the household surveys (Tables 2 and 3). 
For remittance amounts, comparability is slightly compromised by the 
different currencies used. However the mean amounts per year – €2600 
for Burim and $3430 for Xarbán – are remarkably similar given the higher 
value of the euro. What differs is the distribution of amounts, with Burim 
remittances more tightly bunched around the modal class of €1000-2000. 
For Xarbán, a greater share of households receives either lower or larger 
amounts. These differences mainly reflect the wage limitations of the labour 
market for immigrants in Greece. The New York economy offers greater 
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earning opportunities, but not for all immigrants, and some may still be 
paying off debts to smugglers.
Table 2   Burim and Xarbán: annual remittances per household
Burim (euros) Xarbán (dollars)
no. % no. %
< 1000 66 18.9 23 30.3
1000-2000 139 39.7 8 10.5
2000-4000 76 21.7 23 30.3
4000-6000 44 12.6 10 13.1
> 6000 25 7.1 12 15.8
N households 350 100.0 76 100.0
Source: Authors’ surveys.
Table 3 shows that remitting frequency is much higher in Xarbán, where 
60 per cent of remittances are sent at least monthly, compared to only 9 
per cent in Burim, where most remittances are sent two to four times per 
year. This contrast is directly linked to the preferred method of transfer. 
Most remittances to Xarbán are sent electronically via money transfer 
operators (MTOs) or via other formal channels, whereas Burim’s closeness 
to Greece means that the vast majority of remittances are ‘hand-carried’ 
when migrants return for visits, or sent via relatives or trusted co-villagers 
who are travelling.
Table 3  Burim and Xarbán: remitting frequencies by remitters to households
Burim Xarbán
no. % no. %
Weekly or fortnightly 3 0.9 25 15.8
Monthly 27 7.7 69 43.7
Every two months 31 8.9 1 0.6
Every three to six months 194 55.4 43 27.2
Once a year 58 16.6 7 4.4
Irregular/as needed 37 10.6 13 8.2
N remitters 350 100.0 158 100.0
Source: Author’s surveys. 
Note: Whereas for Burim (N=350) only the remitting frequency of the main remitter is recorded; for 
Xarbán it was all remitters to the households (hence N=158).
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5.1. Remittance dyads and gender-power relations
Tables 4 and 5 set out the main remittance dyads for Xarbán and Burim 
respectively. The listing of the dyads is in their order of frequency as re-
ported in the survey, interview and key-informant data. Kinship, gender 
and generation are the main structuring variables for these dyads, but issues 
of power, particularly patriarchal power, are the real ‘drivers’ behind the 
relationships mapped out. What is also interesting – and this is one of our 
main research questions – is how the transnationalisation of these kinship 
links through migration and the experience of sending and receiving remit-
tances acts to modify, or even reinforce, these gendered power-geometries.
Both the Albanian and Ecuadorian societies can be regarded as patriar-
chal; however we perceive Albanian rural society as more deeply structured 
along patriarchal lies than the Ecuadorian one. Ecuadorian village society 
reflects the kind of patriarchal and matriarchal values sanctioned by the 
Catholic Church: a system of fairly traditional gender roles but with women 
retaining some agency within the maternal and caring spheres and engag-
ing in farm labour as childrearing and other responsibilities allow. The 
nuclear family predominates, although kinship links remain strong (Kyle 
2000; Pribilsky 2007; Weismantel 1998).
Albanian rural society conforms to many of these same gendered values, 
but there are essential differences. Religion, outlawed by the communist 
regime which declared Albania ‘an atheist state’, plays a minor role although 
people are aware of their Muslim, Orthodox or mixed heritage. What dis-
tinguishes the Albanian case is the more hierarchically ordered gender and 
generational structures, in particular the ‘ownership’ of the daughter by 
her father, and the way in which this ‘possession’ is passed to her husband 
and his paternal family upon marriage (de Waal 2005; Saltmarshe 2001). 
These gender-power relationships, ‘legitimised’ by Albanian customary law 
and by no means eradicated by the communist regime’s commitment to 
gender-equality, are more f irmly entrenched in the north of Albania; less 
so in the south, where Burim is located. Our data from southern Albania 
show some departures from this normative patriarchal framework, as we 
shall see. However we start with Xarbán as the patterns here are more 
straightforward.
5.2. Xarbán and New York
From Xarbán emigration started as a male-led phenomenon and has re-
mained so, due to the continued ‘illegal’ status of the migrants in the US, 
which makes family settlement very diff icult. This, rather than patriarchal 
principles per se, has determined that remittance-senders are mainly males 
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living abroad as single men, whether they are married or not. For Xarbán, 
by far the most common dyad comprises married men who remit to their 
wives (Table 4). When married migrants are still childless, the ‘left-behind’ 
wife feels more vulnerable:
If the money ever stops arriving and I am used to living a comfortable life, 
that’s bad. Suddenly something goes wrong with my husband… then I am 
fucked — (Gabriela, age 45, no children).
All respondents (senders and receivers alike) agree that the obligation to 
send remittances becomes stronger once children are born, especially if 
there is at least one son:
Once I had my kids my life improved. Before that, he sent $20 a month to me; 
he didn’t care whether I had shoes on my feet or not. Now he sends $400 a 
month. Because of the children. He must send [money to support them]   
— (Berta, 30, two daughters and one son).
In the minority of cases where the migrant unit is the married couple, other 
dyads are formed. In these cases, often the children remain in Xarbán, but 
the form of the dyad depends on the age of the children (Table 4). If the 
latter are old enough to live independently, they are remittance recipients, 
usually father to son. If they are younger, they live with relatives, usually 
with their maternal grandmother, or as a second option with a maternal 
aunt. Note how, with these latter dyads, female kinship patterns prevail 
over male ones – in contrast with the Albanian case. Also in Albania, it is 
rare to f ind the parent-offspring dyad.
Table 4  Main remittance dyads, Xarbán
Sender (New York) Receiver (Xarbán)
Married male migrant alone abroad → Wife (and children)
Married couple abroad → Maternal female relatives  
(caring for migrants’ children)
Married couple abroad → Children (if old enough)
Single male → Parents (father)
Source: Mata-Codesal (2011: 103).
The f inal dyad in Table 4 is the single unmarried male to his parents – usu-
ally to the father, even if the responsibility for managing the daily household 
budget falls to the wife. Given the relatively large size of families in rural 
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Ecuador, many village-based families have more than one son abroad and 
life for the parents can be relatively well-supported. Sometimes, indeed, 
both the husband and one or more sons are in the US. As Rosa (51, husband 
and three sons abroad) put it, ‘Here you can live well on money from the 
US’. But this improvement in material well-being is not without its negative 
side. Loneliness and long-term physical separation are often mentioned as 
major drawbacks of emigration by remittance receivers:
Sometimes I miss them [her children abroad]. I did not want them to 
emigrate, but they told me: ‘We can’t just stay here with you, starving.’ Now, 
I buy 50 cents of bananas and they go bad, there is no one to eat them. I wish 
they would be here to eat them. When people are alone, this is bad. But you 
have to be hard-hearted  —  (Graciela, 48, widow with four migrant children 
in the US).
Also, where there are several migrants from the same family, the f inancial 
burden of sending remittances is shared, which lightens individual respon-
sibility. In the case of parents who have both migrant and non-migrant 
children, the former are responsible for providing f inancial and material 
support, whilst the latter perform the local care of the older generation. 
Obviously this division of the f inancial responsibility and emotional caring 
depends on agreement between the siblings. As Pribilsky (2004) found in 
another part of highland Ecuador, those families who can convivir (live 
side-by-side) have better relationships and are more likely to succeed 
economically and socially.
On the whole, Xarbán’s remittance dynamics tend not to challenge 
traditional gender roles but are patterned within them. Men are still cast in 
the breadwinner role, albeit from afar, and women stay at home taking care 
of the household and the children. Some reordering, however, does occur 
in generational relations. Where migrants remit to support their parents, 
a kind of role reversal occurs. As a father remarked: ‘How can I complain 
[about my children] if we live on them! Before we were the parents, now 
they are our parents’.
The case of Xarbán should not be generalised too widely, however. 
Parallel f ieldwork by Mata-Codesal (2011) in another Ecuadorian highland 
community where most emigration is of females to Spain shows much more 
fundamental gender-role adjustments. Research by Bastia and Busse (2011) 
on international migration from Bolivia and Peru uncovers a variety of 
gendered effects. Women’s autonomous migration from Bolivia to Argentina 
shows ‘gender gains’ to be short-lived. Those who migrate to Spain achieve 
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greater independence but patriarchal relations are reconstituted when 
return migration takes place. Peruvian migration to the US replicates the 
Ecuadorian model, being led by men with women left behind to fulf il 
childbearing, household and caring duties (Julca 2005).
5.3. Burim and Thessaloniki
Table 5 displays the four main dyads for households in Burim. Unsurpris-
ingly, there is some similarity with the patterns in Xarbán. The crucial 
difference is that Albanian migration has evolved from a pattern of un-
documented males working in Greece in the informal labour market to a 
subsequent stage where most migrants are legally present (albeit dependent 
on time-limited sojourn and work permits) and are able to bring in their 
families. Hence Albanian remittance dyads have been dynamic over time, 
reflecting the changing structure of the transnational family (Levitt and 
Lamba-Nieves 2013).
Table 5  Main remittance dyads, Burim
Sender (Thessaloniki) Receiver (Burim)
Married male migrant alone abroad → Wife (and children)
Single male → Parents (father)
Married male migrant alone abroad → Extended family (father)
Married couple abroad → Husband’s parents (father)
Source: Vullnetari and King (2011: 113-123).
Despite this progressive trend towards family-settlement migration, the 
most common dyad from the household survey remains that from the 
migrant husband to his village-based wife, who usually has children to look 
after. Within this main dyadic type there are two variations. In the f irst, the 
husband works in Greece all-year-round and makes occasional visits to the 
village. The relatively short distance involved makes this pattern of visits 
possible, although the husband’s full-time work may limit the time available. 
The second variant is the seasonal migrant, typically a farm worker in 
Greece, who alternates up to six months in Greece (the time-limit of an 
agricultural-work visa) with the rest of the time in the village. According 
to the survey data, average annual remittances from seasonal migrants are 
less than half the amounts sent by full-time migrants, a difference which 
reflects not only the different time periods in migration but also different 
types of work – the long-term migrant is likely to have a more secure and 
better-paid job. Below, a village interviewee describes the precarious nature 
of her husband’s employment in Greece:
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He works in the peach orchards… Then, when that f inishes, he goes 
elsewhere and does welding jobs, whatever he can f ind, all sorts of work  
—  (Monda, 45, wife of seasonal migrant).
These two subtypes have other differences, more gender-related. Wives 
whose husbands are away for all or most of the year become de facto heads 
of household, which is usually seen by them as an extra burden rather than 
empowerment. For the seasonal-migrant arrangement, the circulating male 
retains more of the head-of-household role, often integrating seasonal work 
abroad with farming at home.
Another variant occurs when the recipient wife also has to care for other 
family members – usually her husband’s elderly parents.4 This arrangement 
reflects the fact that she ‘belongs’ to her husband’s family and has care duties 
towards them, which in fact may preclude her from joining her husband 
abroad. If she is a co-resident with her in-laws, then the remittance dyad 
shifts and becomes from her husband to his father (the third dyad in Table 
5) since he is regarded as the household head. However, if the ‘patriarch’ is 
too ill (or deceased), the wife and/or mother-in-law receive and manage the 
remittances. This is the case in the following quote, where the father-in-law, 
in his 80s, is very sick:
My husband brings the money with him when he comes to visit… in April, 
August and New Year… three times a year… There is no f ixed amount, it 
depends on how his work is going. Myself and my mother-in-law, we women 
manage it  — (Elda, 34, three children and husband’s elderly parents to care 
for).
The second-ranked dyad for Burim (Table 5) is from the son to the father. 
Where the son is single, this will be the main dyad. Remittances from 
single young male migrants can be quite substantial, especially if they 
are bound to their parents by a strong sense of f ilial duty (King et al. 2011); 
and bearing in mind that they do not have their own nuclear families to 
support. If the parental household has two or more single sons working 
abroad, then it is on the receiving end of multiple main dyads, and may 
accumulate substantial amounts of capital. Regarded as savings rather than 
remittances, this ‘excess’ capital will likely be directed towards the selection 
of a building plot and the construction of dwellings, in readiness for the 
future marriages of the single sons. Whether these ‘remittance houses’ will 
ever be permanently lived in is another question (Dalakoglou 2010).
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The fourth dyad in Table 5 concerns remittances from married couples 
living abroad. Signif icant remittances are not usually expected from 
migrants living abroad as nuclear families since it is understood that their 
main f inancial duties are towards themselves and their children. However, 
modest sums may be sent to the husband’s parents to support them in 
their old age; such transfers are labelled ‘pensions’ rather than viewed as 
remittances. However these transfers are enhanced in their quantity and 
regularity if the older generation is looking after the migrants’ children – an 
arrangement which allows both migrant parents to work full-time in Greece.
Thus far we have described and exemplif ied the four main Thessaloniki-
Burim dyads, all sent by males, either to fathers, or to wives if the migrant is 
married and has migrated alone. In Burim, as in the rest of Albania, women 
have become increasingly involved in the migration process, albeit hardly 
ever as ‘independent’ migrants. To what extent have they become active as 
remitters? The answer is simple: to a very limited extent. The traditional 
Albanian family model excludes this since women are regarded as the 
‘property’ of men (their fathers, then their husbands) and hence income 
earned by married women in migration likewise passes to their husbands 
and, if remitted, goes to the husband’s parents, not her own. This traditional 
remittance model was found to be still in operation in an earlier study 
based on remittances sent by migrants originating from northern Albania 
(King et al. 2006).
However, interview data from Burim found that women were not entirely 
excluded from the remitting process (see also Smith 2009). Remittances sent 
along the female line are nearly always ‘secondary’ dyads. In fact they are 
not referred to as remittances at all but as ‘presents’ or as small amounts 
of money ‘just for a coffee’ – phrases which clearly denote their informal 
and unoff icial nature. Usually female-origin remittances are sent or given 
to female kin, above all mothers and sisters (cf. Rahman and Fee 2009). 
Female remittances to the wife’s parents might also occur if two other 
circumstances arise: the wife’s parents have no sons (such ‘daughters-only’ 
families are the subject of pity and sympathy in Albania); or the husband’s 
parents are dead. Irene (37) was living in Thessaloniki with her husband 
and young son. They used to remit mainly to her husband’s parents, but 
they had died.
I don’t send them [her parents] money like a pension [i.e. regularly] but 
whenever some relative goes there [to the village], I would send them €100 
or €200 as a dhoro [Greek for ‘gift’]… Besides money we might buy them 
clothes, we take them food when we visit…
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The uses of phrases like ‘gifts’ and ‘just for a coffee’ indicate that the 
conceptualisation and terminology of remittances also needs attention.5 
For now, we return to the main questions underlying our analysis, and 
interpret them first in relation to the theoretical ideas associated with social 
remittances and gendered geometries of power; and secondly in terms of the 
wider debates on the migration-development nexus.
6. Discussion: social remittances and gender power 
relations
Following Levitt (1998: 933-934), social remittances are ‘normative struc-
tures [which] are ideas, values and beliefs’, and ‘systems of practice [which] 
are the actions shaped by normative structures’. It is easy to conceive of 
gender relations both as a normative structure (e.g. patriarchy), and as a 
system of practice – the casual or quotidian encounters and gendered divi-
sions of social roles, including the gendered remittance dyads discussed 
above. This framework maps onto the two key questions which frame our 
empirical analysis: f irstly the way the normative structures of family and 
patriarchy shape the initial migration and the follow-on practice of sending 
remittances; and secondly the way that the transnational gendered social 
practice of remittance-sending has the potential to reshape gender relations 
amongst the transnational migrant community, including non-migrant 
villagers.
Both sending societies – Xarbán/Ecuador and Burim/Albania – are 
essentially patriarchal and this patriarchality frames the migration pro-
cess, which was male-dominated from the start in both contexts. Males 
made up the substantial majority of the initial migrants; this has held true 
subsequently for Xarbán, less so for Burim where women have joined the 
early male-only flows. The gendered power geometries of these migrations 
are very clear; also the inferior ‘social location’ of women within the local 
and (through migration) transnational power hierarchies (cf. Mahler and 
Pessar 2001). Men have orchestrated the decisions as to who should migrate, 
determining that their wives and daughters should stay at home, or only join 
them under the gendered and constrained mechanism of family reunion. 
The latter option has been made possible by regularisation schemes in 
Greece, but not the US where most Ecuadorians remain undocumented.
Yet, there are indications that patriarchal control over female migration 
in Ecuador is far from absolute, since there has been extensive female migra-
tion from other parts of Ecuador to Spain and Italy (Boccagni 2009; Gratton 
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2007; Mata-Codesal 2011). The conclusion, therefore, is that in Xarbán the 
male near-monopoly of migration is a combination of patriarchy and the 
migration control regime of the principal destination country, the United 
States. For Albania, the patriarchal shaping of migration is stronger. Whilst 
it is true that in both Greece and Italy women now make up more than 
40 per cent of the Albanian migrant populations, nearly all of these are 
dependent wives and relatives. Independent female migration is still rare 
in rural Albania. Most young women who move abroad on their own are 
university students or graduates pursuing higher degrees and professional 
careers, and come from better-off urban backgrounds (Vullnetari 2007: 44).
Moving to the second key question: what have been the effects of remit-
tances on gender dynamics within the transnational family? For Burim, we 
observe the following. First, men retain priority in the remittance process, 
reflecting the overall patriarchy of Albanian society and the more specif ic 
patrilinearity of family structures. Second, and countering the f irst point, 
some women have been ‘allowed’, or have insisted, or have resorted to secret 
means, to send remittances themselves, generally to their parents or sisters. 
However, the hegemonic male discourse surrounding remittances down-
plays these female transfers as mere ‘gifts’ or ‘just for a coffee’. Third, the 
migration of husbands has turned wives into remittance receivers (except 
where the wife has moved into the household of her husband’s parents). 
If the husband is abroad all-year-round, wives have the responsibility of 
administering the remittances and the rest of the household – children, 
livestock, vegetable garden etc. Many complained of these extra economic 
and management responsibilities. Family separation has emotional costs 
too, not only for the woman but also for children who lack a father-f igure 
in their everyday lives. The overall effect is to increase women’s burden 
rather than facilitate any ‘social relocation’ via agency and empowerment.
Many of the points made above also apply to Xarbán. Here too we see 
a migration process led by men set within a home society where men are 
accorded more power and status than women. We also note more female 
decision-making in the management of the household due to incoming 
remittances and the long-term absence of men in the family. When hus-
bands/fathers return, we f ind both a wish to reclaim the dominant male 
role within the family, but also a greater involvement in household chores 
because of their ‘forced training’ in these tasks whilst abroad, living in a 
largely male-only domestic environment. Here is an interview extract from 
a returnee. Asked whether he has brought back any ‘American’ habits to 
Xarbán, he replied:
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Mmm… well, the habit I brought is that one has to do everything in the 
house – washing, cooking, ironing [laughs] because… if you want to save 
money, you have to do all those things yourself. You get used to it. So, here 
[in Xarbán] I continue to wash-up and cook. This is more than a habit, it’s an 
obligation… and it is much better here because it is in your own home  
— (Rigoberto, 42, married returnee from Queens, New York).
Another gender-related change in quotidian practice occurs with the mi-
grant household abroad. Below, an interviewee in Thessaloniki describes 
the reality of household life when the need for both spouses to work brings 
a reallocation of domestic responsibilities:
My wife comes home at six in the evening. Who will cook and clean for me? 
Who will look after the children? I have to take my share of doing those 
things… They [referring to people in his home village] don’t understand 
when we explain the tough life in Greece, the conditions we live in…  
— (Alket, 47, married with family in Thessaloniki).
What is interesting in both these quotes is the extent to which changes 
in gender norms and practices are the result, on the one hand, of a direct 
engagement with, and internalisation of, the gender-values of the host 
society; or, on the other hand, the fact that these changes are forced by the 
realities of living abroad, either as a functionally single man in New York, 
or as a hard-working nuclear family in Thessaloniki.
Conclusion
What light do these research results shed on the bigger questions surround-
ing the links between migration and (under)development outlined at the 
beginning of the paper? How do remittances contribute to remaking the 
relationship between poor, remittance-receiving countries and the richer, 
migrant host countries? Are migration and remittances part of a virtuous or 
vicious cycle for Albania and Ecuador? The short answer to the last question 
is ‘a bit of both’; but on the whole, we feel that a measure of ‘neo-pessimism’ 
(de Haas 2012: 22) is justif ied.
These issues need to be appraised at two levels: f irst at the micro-to-meso 
level of individual migrants and their family and community networks. 
Both Xarbán and Burim are saturated with the effects of migration: most 
households have relatives abroad and remittances are the mainstay of 
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the communities’ economic existence. For farming families remittances 
are a complement to food produced locally, perfectly exemplifying the 
NELM model. For Albania as a whole, an IOM study based on detailed 
questionnaire surveys in Greece and Italy (N=712) and on household surveys 
in Albania (N=1066) concluded that, at the household level, ‘access to a 
migration network and family exposure to migration (because of the remit-
tances that follow) is one of the most viable means to escape poverty’ (de 
Zwager et al. 2005: vi). Our data confirm this. However, the downside is that 
the combination of material and social remittances has mainly worked to 
generate more migration – or at least to foster an imagination or expectation 
of migration – amongst the younger generation. Moreover, remittances 
have reached a stage where they act as a substitute for local economic and 
employment activity, thereby further depressing the dynamism of the local 
economy. The main exception is the way that remittances stimulate the lo-
cal construction sector, reflecting the fervour with which migrants in Burim 
and Xarbán invest in building new houses in their home villages. Often 
these houses have symbolic rather than real economic or functional value: 
they are a physical demonstration of ‘success’ in emigration and a marker 
for a future return, although there is no guarantee that such a return, except 
for holidays, will take place. Although emigration is unlikely to regain the 
mass-outmigration rates of the 1990s and early-mid 2000s, we foresee that 
this dependency-cycle of migration, remittances, and more migration will 
carry forward as long as factors such as limited local employment and career 
prospects, remoteness, poor infrastructures and unstable local governance 
continue to bedevil the sending areas.
In terms of the macro scale of the national level and the international 
political economy of remittances, the dependency relationship is equally 
clear. The earlier ‘dependency-school’ characterisation of the Mexico-US 
migration also holds for Ecuador. Here the various components of neolib-
eralism – privatisation, deregulation, structural adjustment, and dollarisa-
tion – have led to a ‘devalorisation’ of labour, both in the sending context, 
where in economic terms it is generated as an unwanted surplus, and in 
the US where it enters employment niches under conditions of extreme 
precarity. In this scenario, remittances have a social meaning beyond 
their monetary manifestation and beyond the Levitt def inition of social 
remittances. Paraphrasing Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias (2011: 
65), remittances signify the stretching of the social relations of production 
across the globe in a context of super-exploitation and social exclusion of 
migrant workers. Rather than an instrument of development, remittances 
represent a fraction of wage-labour income designated to cover the subsist-
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ence of family dependents in the place of origin, including the upbringing 
and reproduction of future labour migrants.
This neo-Marxist explanatory framework also resonates, to some extent, 
for the geographically compact Albania-Greece migration and remittance 
corridor. The dominance of each country in the other’s migratory system 
(most Albanian migrants are in Greece, most immigrants in Greece are 
Albanians) perhaps implies a more mutual dependency, even a symbiosis 
(Baldwin-Edwards 2004). Albanian workers have become a structural 
component of the Greek economy’s labour force, socially stigmatised yet 
willing to do almost any job for low wages. On the other hand, the current 
contraction and extreme fragility of the Greek economy means that Alba-
nians are the f irst to feel the pinch as their mostly casual service labour and 
construction-sector work is dispensed with. In an interesting recent review 
of the impact of the Greek crisis on Albanian migrants in a small town in 
northern Greece, Michail (2013) describes a complex picture of adaptation, 
hunkering down, partial return migration, and above all uncertainty over 
the future.
Summing up, our paper has offered a rare example of a comparative 
analysis of gendered migration and remittance dynamics in two contrast-
ing global settings, set within the wide-ranging topical debate over the 
relationship between migration and development. Deploying the concept 
of migration dyads and their links to gendered power geometries, we have 
excavated the main personal patterns of remittance transfers, so often 
hidden within the black box of monetary sums and spending patterns. 
Despite differences in geography and family settings, we have found more 
similarities than differences in the two cases studied.
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Notes
1. In 2009 the cost of an ‘illegal’ migration to New York varied between $12,000 and $20,000, 
depending on the route and the reputation of the pasadores (smugglers) hired (Mata-Codesal 
2011: 115).
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2. However the introduction of a visa requirement in 2003 left family reunion as the main 
legal entry route. Like Albanian women in Greece, most Ecuadorian women in Spain work 
as domestic helpers or carers of elderly locals.
3. The survey recorded information not only on the respondent but also other household 
members, including those abroad. The 15 per cent f igure takes into account the larger average 
household size in Xarbán than Burim.
4. And hardly ever her own parents, who are the responsibility of her brother(s) and their 
wives. Traditionally, it is the role of the youngest son to take care of parents in their later 
years. The youngest son is called ‘the son of old age’ in Albania.
5. We have dealt with this, based on our Ecuadorian and Albanian material, in another paper 
(Mata-Codesal et al. 2011: 20-30). 
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